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AQ Khan admits Pakistan helped N Korea in its nuclear weapons programme | Pakistan's disgraced nuclear scientist Abdul Qadeer Khan has revealed that the North Korean Government opened a second way to build nuclear weapons as early as the 1990s. According to the Washington Post, Khan claimed that
Pyongyang might have been enriching uranium on a small scale by 2002, with "maybe
3,000 or even more" centrifuges, and that Pakistan helped the country with vital
machinery, drawings and technical advice for at least six years. Though Khan's
account could not be independently corroborated, a US intelligence official and a
diplomat said his information adds to their suspicions that North Korea has long
pursued
the enrichment of uranium in addition to making plutonium for bombs, and may help
explain Pyongyang's assertion in September that it is in the final stages of such
enrichment. Khan's account of the pilot plant, which he says North Korea built
without help, is included in a narrative that depicts relations between the two
countries' scientists as exceptionally close for nearly a decade. Khan says, for
example, that during a visit to North Korea in 1999, he toured a mountain tunnel.
There, his hosts showed him boxes containing components of three finished nuclear
warheads, which could be assembled for use atop missiles within an hour. "While
they explained the construction [design of their bombs], they quietly showed me
the six boxes" containing split cores for the warheads, as well as "64
ignitors/detonators
per bomb packed in 6 separate boxes," Khan is quoted, as saying. His visit occurred
seven years before the country's first detonation, prompting some current and
former U.S. officials to say that Khan's account, if correct, suggests North Korea's
achievements were more advanced than previously known, and that the country may
have more sophisticated weapons, or a larger number, than earlier estimated. But
Siegfried S. Hecker, a former Los Alamos National Laboratory director who was
allowed to see some North Korean plutonium during a visit to its nuclear facilities
in January 2004, said he remains unconvinced about Pyongyang having enough fissile
material on hand to make such weapons as far back as 1999. Hecker said Khan
may
have tried to get himself "off the hook, to say what [he] . . . did was not that
bad because these guys already had nuclear weapons. That's a nice way to cover
his own tracks." Since some of Khan's actions were exposed in 2003 and 2004, top
Pakistani officials have called him a rogue proliferator. Khan said, however,
there was a tacit agreement between the two governments that his laboratory "would
advise and guide them with the centrifuge program and that the North Koreans
would
help Pakistan in fitting the nuclear warhead into the Ghauri missile" -- his country's
name for its version of the Nodong missiles that Pakistan bought from North Korea.
Pakistan gave North Korea vital equipment and software, and in return North Korea
also "taught us how to make Krytrons" -- extremely fast electrical switches that
are used in nuclear detonations and are tightly controlled in international commerce.
Contradicting Pakistani statements that the government had no involvement in such
sensitive transfers, Khan says top political and Army officials, including then-Lt.
Gen. Khalid Kidwai, who currently oversees Pakistan's atomic arsenal, approved
his assistance. Khan, 73, is under house arrest in Islamabad. He has threatened
to disclose sensitive information if he remains in confinement. Pakistani officials
in Washington dismissed Khan's assertions as baseless, without responding to
questions
about Kidwai's role. "Pakistan, as a nuclear weapons state, has always acted with
full responsibility and never engaged itself in any activity in violation of the
non-proliferation norms," the embassy said in a statement. Song Ryol Han, the
North Korean ambassador to the United Nations, denied that his country had a
uranium
program before last spring or that it ever discussed the issue "with Dr. Khan
in Pakistan." A U.S. government nuclear expert, speaking on the condition of
anonymity
because of the sensitivity of the subject, said constructing a plant of this size
would probably be seen as "a very serious commitment" to making nuclear arms with
a method that is hard to detect. Several former U.S. officials, after being informed
of Khan's statements, said they undermine North Korea's 1994 pledge to work with
the United States "for peace and security on a nuclear-free Korean peninsula." |
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